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ABSTRACT 
This paper focuses on the challenges related to, and the risk management needed 
in, the process of business model innovation. Business model innovation may 
involve hefty investments, high levels of uncertainty, complexity and, inevitably, 
risk. Although many firms follow a first mover strategic approach, arguing from a 
“no risk no reward” aphorism, a sloppy implementation approach towards 
business model innovation may result in catastrophic, sometimes even fatal, 
consequences to a firm’s core business. Based on four unsuccessful business model 
innovation experiences, which took place in three industrial firms, we discuss the 
reasons that led to these failures, and outline various possible solutions for 
practitioners to manage business model innovation adequately. 
 
Keywords: Business Model Innovation; Risk Management; Case Studies. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Business model innovation is risky business, especially if a firm follows a first mover, 
prospector (Miles and Snow, 1994) strategy and goes for a radically new business 
model. Many managers recognize that taking, while at the same time controlling, risks 
is fundamental to successfully developing and implementing a sustainable business 
model. However, in spite of the considerable body of literature on risk management, 
particularly in relation to project (e.g. Kendrick, 2003; Chapman and Ward, 2004) and 
product innovation (e.g. Keizer and Halman, 2007) management, it has not yet been 
fully incorporated into business model innovation practice (Deloitte & Touche, 2008). 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1  RISK, RISK MANAGEMENT AND RISK APPETITE 
The term risk refers to “uncertainty of outcome” (Chapman and Ward, 2004). Risk 
management has been defined as “the systematic application of management policies, 
procedures and practices to the tasks of communicating, consulting, establishing the 
context, identifying, analyzing, evaluating, treating, monitoring and reviewing risk” 
(ISO/IEC Guide 73, 2003). 
The evolution of risk management has come a long way in the past two decades. 
However, although firms have successfully adopted risk management in their internal 
audit, treasury, insurance, environmental health and safety, and legal functions, it has 
not yet been fully incorporated into core business processes related to future growth, 
such as strategic planning, capital allocation, and performance management (Deloitte & 
Touche, 2008). This seems to imply that unrewarded risks, in the sense that no premium 
is obtained from managing them – only the potential for loss is reduced, are the main 
driver in today’s risk management practices, while managing rewarded risks, which are 
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part and parcel of decision-making processes associated with future growth, is not yet 
fully embedded in organizational change and innovation processes. Furthermore, even if 
firms attempt to manage rewarded risks systematically, for example in project (e.g. 
Kendrick, 2003; Chapman and Ward, 2004) or product innovation (e.g. Keizer and 
Halman, 2007) management, they essentially assume that those risks can be managed in 
isolation from the rest of the system. Recent surveys and studies (e.g. Taplin, 2005; 
Deloitte & Touche, 2008), however, have shown that a growing percentage of managers 
worldwide are interested in applying risk management in a much more comprehensive 
(i.e. proactive and holistic) manner.  
Risk appetite is “the total impact of risk an organization is prepared to accept in the 
pursuit of its strategic objectives” (KPMG 2009, p. 3). HM Treasury (2006) developed 
a risk appetite scale, which helps firms to map various possible impact categories (e.g. 
reputation and credibility; operational and policy delivery; financial and legal/regulatory 
compliance) and to determine their corporate risk appetite on a scale ranging from 
“averse” to “hungry” (see Table 1). 
 
How (risk) hungry 
is the firm? 
Description 
Averse Avoidance of risk and uncertainty is a key objective 
Minimalist Preference for ultra-safe options that have a low degree of inherent risk and only 
have a potential for limited reward 
Cautious Preference for safe options that have a low degree of residual risk and may only 
have limited potential for reward 
Open Willing to consider all options and choose the one that is most likely to result in 
successful delivery while also providing an acceptable level of reward 
Hungry Eager to be innovative and to choose options based on potential higher rewards 
(despite greater inherent risk) 
Table 1. Corporate Risk Appetite Scale (Source: HM Treasury, 2006) 
2.2  BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATIVENESS SCALE 
When can we call a change in an organization a business model innovation? Three 
approaches have been proposed. The first approach, associated with business model 
innovation radicality, “defines” a new business model on a scale ranging from 
incrementally to radically different from previous models. The second approach defines 
innovativeness in terms of, what might be called, the reach of the innovation. A suitable 
scale to measure the degree that an innovation is “new to whom” could be one ranging 
from new to the firm, via new to the market and new to the industry, to new to the world 
(Rogers 1983). The third approach considers measuring the innovativeness of a business 
model through its complexity, i.e. the number of building blocks changed. Any change 
in one of the building blocks would constitute a simple innovation, while simultaneous 
changes in all of the building blocks would be the most complex form of business 
model innovation. 
If we combine these three approaches, a three-dimensional space, first proposed by 
Taran et al. (2008) and later published as Taran et al. (2015), emerges, which helps in 
qualifying the innovativeness of a new business model (Figure 1): 
• Radicality – how new (incremental vs. radical) is each building block (see 
Table 2).  
• Reach – to whom is the innovation new? 
• Complexity – number of building blocks changed simultaneously. 
978-90-77360-18-7 © CINet 2015 921 
 
Figure 1. A Three-Dimensional (Business Model) Innovativeness Scale (Source: Taran 
et al. 2015) 
  Building block Incremental innovation 
“Do what we do but better” 
Radical innovation 
“Do something different” 
1. Value proposition  Offering “more of the same” Offering something different (at least 
to the firm) 
2. Target customer Existing market New market 
3. Customer 
relationship 
Continuous improvements of existing 
channels 
New relationship channels (e.g. 
physical/virtual, personal/peers/ mass 
awareness) 
4. Value chain 
architecture  
Exploitation (e.g. internal, lean, 
continuous improvements) 
Exploration (e.g. open, flexible, 
diversified) 
5. Core competences Familiar competences (e.g. 
improvement of existing technology)  
Disruptive new, unfamiliar, 
competences (e.g. new emerging 
technology) 
6. Partner network Familiar (fixed) network New (dynamic) networks (e.g. 
alliance, joint-venture)  
7. Profit formula Existing processes to generate 
revenues followed-by/or incremental 
processes of (cost) retrenchments 
New processes to generate revenues 
followed-by/or disruptive processes of 
(cost) retrenchments 
Table 2. Incremental and Radical Orientation to Each Building Block 
In this space, any business model innovation can be positioned in terms of its degree of 
radicality, reach and complexity. Some changes are more radical and/or complex than 
others, and some (e.g. radical product innovation, incremental process improvement) are 
better understood than others (e.g. a holistic, new to the world departure from all 
business models known so far). The assumption underpinning this paper is that the risks 
involved in business model innovation increase with the radicality, reach and 
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2.3  Research objective 
The above discussion shows that risk, risk appetite, risk management and, to a certain 
extent, business model innovativeness are relatively established constructs. However, 
their role and interaction in business model innovation processes is not well understood. 
More particularly, the question is how risk, risk appetite, risk management and business 
model innovativeness interact to affect the eventual outcome of a business model 
innovation process, in terms of its “success” or “failure”. The objective of this paper is: 
To learn about 1) the interaction between risk, risk appetite, risk 
management and business model innovativeness and 2) its effects on the 
success of business model innovation. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1  CASE STUDIES DESCRIPTION 
Four retrospective case studies of business model innovation processes undertaken by 
three industrial firms (Table 3) provide the empirical basis for this paper. We selected 
these firms based on their relatively successful, yet somewhat different, business model 
innovation experiences over the years, and focused on the, in total four, cases in which 
they failed to implement their new business model attempts successfully. The study 
began early 2009 and ended in 2013.  
 
Alpha  Beta  Gamma 
Large global firm, which is 
specialized in developing, 
manufacturing and marketing 
(for the most part) professional 
audio products 
Large global firm, specialized in 
developing, manufacturing and 
marketing flexible electrical/electronic 
control and instrumentation solutions 
within power production, marine and 
offshore 
Large IT firm, which is 
specialized in providing IT 
solutions for primarily public 
organizations 
Two failure cases (A and B) One failure case (3) One failure case (IV) 
Table 3. Firm Descriptions 
3.2  DATA GATHERING TECHNIQUES  
Given the exploratory nature of this research, the case study methodology was adopted 
(Yin, 2003). Multiple qualitative data collection methods were used to ensure the 
validity and reliability of the research. The desk research consisted of information 
gathered through books, articles, websites, as well as documents received from the three 
firms. The field research consisted of interviews (using a standard questionnaire), e-mail 
correspondence and company visits. The questionnaire covered all five constructs (risk, 
risk appetite, risk management, business model innovativeness, success/failure) plus 
contextual variables (e.g. firm background and strategy) and was semi-structured in 
order to allow the respondents maximum freedom to explain their views on the new 
business model and their understanding of the innovation process and the researchers to 
discover unexpected yet relevant issues. Since the case studies were analyzed 
retrospectively, the data could not be acquired through observations. The interviews 
were held with the firms’ middle managers (e.g. technology/innovation, product, project 
or marketing managers). In Alpha, 18 hours of interviews were conducted, and in Beta 7 
hours of interviews in total. In Gamma, the interviewees represented the eleven 
organizations involved in that firm’s business model innovation. More than 25 hours of 
interviews were recorded.  
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3.3  CHOICE FOR DATA ANALYSIS 
The cross-case analysis is focused on identifying and analyzing the similarities and 
differences between the four focal business model innovation experiences. In order to 
increase the credibility of the research, the data gathering and analysis of all cases 
focused on the following, theory based, criteria: 
• Characteristics of the business model innovations, in terms of radicality (how 
new?), reach (new to whom?) and complexity (Table 2 and Figure 2). 
• Overall innovation management. Here, we analyzed the innovation process of 
each firm using Tidd and Bessant’s (2009) innovation model of “Search-Select-
Implement”.  
• Past, present and future risk appetite preference of each firm. At this level 
we were particularly interested to learn how “hungry” each firm was in taking 
risks. Did the risk appetite remain the same or change over the years? And is 
there a link between the top management risk appetite and the firm’s business 
model innovation experiences? 
• Risk and risk management, including both strategic and operational risk 
occurring, and the way these risks were managed (e.g. explicitly, implicitly, 
stage-gate oriented).   
• Fit. Looking for the role of the interaction between risk, risk appetite, risk 
management and business model innovativeness and its effects on the success of 
business model innovation, we particularly focused on the “fit” between these 
constructs, reasoning that the higher the risk appetite of a firm, the higher the 
likelihood that it will pursue a more innovative business model, which will 
involve greater risk which, in turn, needs to be managed more tightly in order for 
the new business model to be realized and become a success. 
Given the exploratory character of the case studies, we also actively sought, but did not 
find, additional criteria emerging from the case studies. 
4. DATA GATHERING RESULTS 
Table 4 shows the four criteria used to cross-analyze the cases, and summarizes the data 
collected. The three firms and their failure cases are*: 
• Alpha – Case A and Case B. 
• Beta – Case 3. 
• Gamma – Case IV. 
5. CROSS-CASE ANALYSIS AND PROPOSITION DEVELOPMENT 
The cross-case analysis produced five propositions, which are organized according to 
the four criteria formulated above. 
5.1 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BUSINESS MODEL INNOVATION AND SUCCESS RATE 
Table 5 summarizes the business model innovation cases in terms of their radicality, 
reach and complexity. Cases A, B and 3 were low in radicality and reach. Case IV, 
however, was high in radicality and reach. All cases were highly complex. 
Case A involved the establishment of a new business unit offering incremental 
                                                   
*  The numbering of the cases stems from previous work, in which also success cases (e.g. case 
1 and 2 of company Beta) were presented and analyzed. See e.g. Taran et al. (2015). 
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improvements to existing products, combined with outsourcing of marketing and sales 
to a partner. Case B concerned outsourcing of manufacturing to a partner, which, 
however, failed to result in a competitive product. Alpha is a highly competent design 
firm, pushing new products into the marketplace and with a successful history of 
collaborative technology development. However, they may have underestimated the 
complexities involved in establishing a successful operational collaboration through 
outsourcing. In Beta, new product development activities are usually based on market-
pull. Case 3 may have failed because the firm “pushed” a radically new product into the 
market without any idea of how customers would respond. Gamma’s case IV was a 
radical and new to the industry innovation, which went far beyond the firm’s previous 
innovation experiences. 
 
VP=value proposition; TC=target customer; VC=value chain; CC=core competences, CR=customer 
relation; PN=partner network; PF=profit formula. 
Table 5. Radicality, Reach and Complexity of the Four Cases 
Thus, the case studies indicate that business model innovation failures are situated at the 
“extremes” of: 1) low radicality and reach, i.e. reactive firms pursuing a Defender 
strategy (Miles and Snow, 1994), and 2) radically (disruptively) new and far reaching, 
i.e. proactive firms pursuing a Prospector strategy. However tempting it may be to 
propose that firms best stay away from the extremes, the more compelling reason for 
failure seems to be lack of prior related knowledge (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Alpha 
was a technology developer, without any experience with operational collaboration. 
Beta understood how to translate market requirements into new products but did not 
understand how to push new technology in to the market place. Gamma overplayed its 
hand by trying to accomplish a new to the industry innovation, which went far beyond 
its previous experiences. 
Proposition 1: Irrespective of a firm’s strategy (defender, prospector) and the business 
model innovativeness pursued (radicality, reach, complexity), lack of 
prior related knowledge is likely to result in business model innovation 
failure. 
5.2  OVERALL INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 
Both Alpha and Beta tried to reuse successful business model innovation processes 
(new idea generation and implementation processes). However, while Alpha was keen 
on pushing ideas and technology into the market place, Beta was more in favor of 
adopting a customer pull strategy. Furthermore, both firms tried not to repeat failures 
made in the past. Consequently, Alpha’s failed outsourcing attempts (cases A and B) led 
the firm to re-experiment with familiar, “pushed”, business model innovations, while 
Beta, based on the failure of case 3, chose to no longer push new ideas and technologies 
into the market place, without consulting their customers first.  
 Case Radicality (to the core 
business) 




Case –A Low: (VP; PN) Low: new to the firm High: VP; TC; VC; PN; CR; 
PF 
Case – B Low: (VC; PN) Low: new to the firm High: VP; TC; VC; CC; PN; 
PF 
Beta Case – 3 Low: VP; TC Low: new to the firm High: VP; TC; CC; VC; PN; 
CR; PF 
Gamma Case – IV High: VP; TC; VC; PN High: new to the industry High: VP, TC, VC, PN, PF 
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 Alpha Beta Gamma 
The four failure 
business model 
innovation cases 
• Case A – New business 
unit offering existing 
technology-based products 
to a new market (studios), 
plus outsourcing of 
marketing and sales to a 
partner (low radicality, 
low reach, high 
complexity). 
• Case B – Outsourcing the 
manufacturing of one of 
the products – failure (low 
radicality, low reach, high 
complexity). 
 
• Case 3 – New technology-
based product, aimed at 
serving existing and potential 
new customer segments: after 
one year of heavy investment 
in the product, the project was 
terminated due to incongruity 
with customer demands 
(product shape and size; price 
– too expensive) – (low 
radicality, low reach, high 
complexity). 
 
• Case IV – New IT solution 




consumption: The project 
was terminated due to 
strategic shift within the 
firm and lack of believe in 
customer demand (high 
radicality, high reach, high 
complexity, given the 
difficulty in network 
structure among the 




Search processes - No 
search process in any of the 
cases. “It was just something 
that came up along the 
way”. One project was 
managed proactively in 
search of a radically new 
business model (Case B). 
Otherwise, it was internal 
competences chosen to be 
used elsewhere. 
Selection and 
implementation processes - 
Following a stage-gate 
model, radical innovation 
ideas are handled with extra 
awareness. A slower 
process, which always starts 
with small steps and then 
grows slowly. Radical ideas 
follow gates similar to those 
of incremental ideas. The 
difference is, though, that it 
takes more time to move 
from gate to gate. 
Search processes – Recognized 
as one of the weaknesses of the 
firm. They do not really have 
any systematic processes to 
manage radical, or even 
incremental, innovation ideas. It 
is something that usually just 
“pops up”.  They give more 
attention to ideas that come from 
their main customers. 
 
Selection and implementation 
processes - A stage-gate model 
is used to move the business 
concept idea through a maturity 
roadmap and development 
process. Many complaints about 
the fact that there is not enough 
market research behind ideas 
proposed. In effect, lacking 
understanding of the potential 
market and sales volume. 
Search processes – 
Initial idea developed by area 
director of the firm. In 
continuation of this initial 
idea, ten additional 
organizations were involved 
into the further development 
of the business idea and the 




implementation processes – 
An open, network-based 
approach to develop and test 
the business idea. A 
development process which 
was marked by a substantial 
number of iterations and 
radical shifts in the overall 
business model 
Risk appetite Used to be between “open” 
and “hungry”. Currently 
moving towards “open” – 
“cautious”, and taking fewer 
risks. Intending to move to 
‘hungry’ again in future. 
Used to be between “open” and 
“cautious”. Currently moving 
towards “open” and “hungry”. 
Willing to take chances and aim 
high, but aware of the risks 
involved in that. 
Mostly “averse”. Currently 
trying to move towards an 
“open” approach. Focusing on 
a new market position in the 
aftermath of a privatization 
process 
Risk and risk 
management 
No explicit risk management 
processes, but rather a 
project culture and a project/ 
innovation model that is 
structured by many gates 
aimed at continuity and 
reducing the risks 
throughout the innovation 
process. It is not an 
advanced risk management 
model, or one that applies a 
risk assessment method, but 
nonetheless a very sufficient 
model to reduce many risks 
through the innovation 
process. 
No explicit risk management 
processes were identified. 
However, their innovation 
processes are highly controlled, 
to insure that strategic decisions 
made at the gates are being 
implemented adequately at the 
stages throughout the innovation 
process, and, the firm considers 
those control processes as a form 
of risk reduction. 
No explicit risk management 
processes were identified. Yet, 
they perceived the openness 
approach as a form of risk 
mitigation and sharing, by 
opening up both the business 
model and its innovation 
process, which would be the 
fundament of the project. The 
firm stated that the project was 
not so much an internal 
development project, but 
rather something, in which all 
the participating organizations 
should be able to mirror 
themselves (i.e. risk sharing). 
Fit None None None 
Table 4. Summary of the Case Data 
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Proposition 2: “Simply” repeating successful business model innovation processes and, 
equally “simply”, dropping unsuccessful approaches, lack of 
experimentation with new business model processes and lack of learning 
from failures decrease the success rate of business model innovation 
significantly.  
5.3  CORPORATE RISK APPETITE LEVEL 
In all three firms, top management had a strong impact on the firm’s corporate risk 
appetite. However, while the replacement of the CEO in Beta, and the privatization 
process that took place in Gamma made both firms more “hungry” and eager to pursue 
new business model opportunities, in Alpha, the significant downturn in the company’s 
profits during the last couple of years, and the hiring of a new CEO, turned the firm to 
become more risk averse. 
Proposition 1: Top management has great influence on the risk appetite of the firm. Fit 
between corporate strategy and the top management’s risk appetite 
should be one of the hiring/firing criteria for top managers.  
5.4  RISK AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
None of the three firms had an explicit risk management program in place. Risks were 
managed implicitly, i.e. embedded in the innovation stage-gate process design (Alpha 
and Beta), or not managed at all (Gamma). In effect, problems continued to manifest 
themselves in different ways. While some issues seemed to have a more tolerable 
impact (e.g. unexpected, but solvable, surprises; goals and objectives that required 
redefinition during the process; accepted solutions that were rejected in a later phase; 
implemented solutions that were less effective or glamorous than anticipated; and/or 
schedule and budget overruns), their cumulative effect caused the entire business model 
innovation project to fail. Clearly, none of the firms was satisfied with their risk 
mitigation processes, but none of them found a solution. They did not really know how 
to optimize the process and, particularly, understand how to manage risks proactively. 
Proposition 4:  Lack of dedicated risk management in a business model innovation 
process increases the likelihood of failure. 
5.5  FIT 
The four failure cases indicate that risk, risk appetite, risk management and business 
model innovativeness and, more importantly, the fit amongst these constructs, play a 
significant role in the success or failure of business model innovation initiatives. In 
cases A, B and 3, both companies Alpha and Beta were “open” (Table 1) to take risk, 
but they pursued low risk, low (overall) innovativeness initiatives, and did not apply any 
risk management mitigation activities regardless of the high complexity (Table 5) 
inherent in the process. In case IV, company Gamma used a more “averse” rather than 
“open” risk appetite approach to a highly risky, highly innovative initiative, and did not 
apply any risk management either. The underlying concept of “fit” plays a central role 
in various theories, including manufacturing strategy (e.g. Skinner, 1985), organization 
theory (e.g. Mintzberg, 1979) and innovation theory (e.g. Boer and During, 2001), but 
has not been used so far to understand the relationships between business model 
innovation and risk management. Miles and Snow (1994), for example, discussed the 
dynamics of internal-external fit. Where they argued that “minimal fit” is necessary for 
insuring a company’s survival, “tight fit” frequently results in excellent administration, 
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while “early fit” may enable a firm to sustain an unusually high level of performance 
over an extended period of time. Yet, they were also aware of the fact that “fit” has its 
limitations as well – even “Hall of Fame” companies may suffer from downturns in 
performance (e.g. due to unexpected external hazard impact).  
Similarly, we also argue that a perfect fit between the four key constructs of risk, risk 
appetite, risk management and business model innovativeness, will not automatically 
insure business model innovation success (and vice versa), but it will increase the 
probability of success substantially. Both Alpha and Beta had multiple successful 
business model innovation experiences in their past, and it has been observed (e.g. 
Taran et al. 2015) that the successful cases had much better alignment features than the 
failed cases. Particularly in the risk, risk appetite, and business model innovativeness 
constructs. Although, as said, risk management was not managed explicitly in any of the 
three firms. Relative to the failure cases, additional “functions” to reduce risk were used 
in the success cases. For example, in the successful cases (e.g. a new joint venture; new 
business unit development) the firms built slack (e.g. Galbraith, 1973) into the process 
by taking more time to get from gate to gate as the level of radicality, reach and/or 
complexity increased. This gave both firms the flexibility to proceed with more caution 
and to terminate those projects that were expected to be unsuccessful without too many 
consequences. In addition, Alfa also mapped each innovation project’s timetable as red, 
yellow, or green to illustrate both its readiness to meet the next gate requirements 
deadline, as well as the sense of urgency for its process completion. We propose: 
Proposition 5:  The likelihood of launching a successful new business model increases 
if the company’s risk appetite, the innovativeness of the business model, 
and the risk management approach adopted align with the risks 
associated with the intended innovation. 
6. CONCLUSION 
6.1  CONTRIBUTION TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 
The cross-case analysis produced five testable propositions. Together, these 
propositions suggest that successful business model innovation depends a great deal on 
the following characteristics: 
• Risk appetite. The top management’s personality, risk appetite, and assessment 
of the firm’s economic position and outlook overall, have great influence on 
selecting the innovativeness of new business model initiatives.   
• The strategic aggressiveness trajectory is vital to consider, and should be 
considered carefully. Top management perception greatly affects their 
appreciation of the nature of the innovation, and may lead to underestimation of 
the difficulties involved, even, or perhaps especially, at the two business model 
innovation extremes of:  
o Incremental (radicality), new-to-the-firm (reach), but highly complex 
business model innovations initiatives. Where risk-averse managers may 
have the impression or, possibly, illusion of “safe enough” business 
model innovation experimentation, the risk of achieving little or no 
positive impact in the market place is high. 
o Radical, new-to-the-industry or new-to-the-world (reach), highly 
complex business model innovations, which, in many cases, depart from 
the firm’s previous strategy, and do not, consequently, build on 
experiences with previous innovations.  
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• The importance of learning from failure should not be overlooked. There are 
many lessons to be learnt from a failed case, in terms of what not to do, and 
what to improve on for next time. The failure cases discussed in this paper 
indicate that due to locked-in path dependency trajectories (Nelson and Winter, 
1982), firms tend to “simply” repeat successful BM innovation processes and to, 
equally “simply”, drop unsuccessful approaches.  The inherent danger is that a 
firm fails to learn how to approach innovations that are essentially new to the 
firm. This may, in turn, decrease its growth potential significantly. 
• Risk management and alignment should not be taken lightly. Even if 1) a 
firm’s risk appetite fits its economic (risky) position and outlook, and 2) the firm 
estimates the nature and characteristics (radicality, complexity, reach) of the 
intended innovation correctly, and is even prepared, if necessary, to learn new 
approaches, business model innovation is still loaded with risks. Hence, risk 
management and, more importantly, its alignment with the other three key 
constructs (i.e. risk, risk appetite, and business model innovativeness) is of 
paramount importance in any business model innovation process. Furthermore, 
it appears that using a widely used approach such as the stage-gate process 
(Cooper, 1993) to manage a business model innovation process is not enough. 
The three firms’ experiences suggest that incorporating dedicated risk 
management processes (Chapman and Ward, 2004) into a business model 
innovation process, whether that process is stage-gate driven or not, can help 
reduce the likelihood of innovation failure. Moreover, as case 3 suggests, risk 
management can also potentially facilitate meeting customers demand. Too 
much focus on technological aspects combined with insufficient attention for 
commercial aspects and, possibly, a ‘push’ strategy, may lead to technical 
success but commercial failure (cf. e.g. Voss, 1988). 
6.3  FURTHER RESEARCH 
The empirical investigation performed in this research involved four retrospective case 
studies, based on mostly qualitative data. There are several well-documented advantages 
to this methodology, such as richness and depth, but also weaknesses related to, 
amongst others, generalization. Accordingly, the case study results and propositions 
developed should be tested on a larger scale. We propose to conduct a mix of 
comparative and longitudinal case studies as a first step, aimed at enriching and 
sharpening the findings presented here. Thereafter a larger case or questionnaire-based 
survey may be used to test and generalize each proposition developed. 
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